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How do executive pay and its gap with employee pay influence corporate 
performance? Evidence from Thailand tourism listed companies 
 
Abstract 
Purpose- We investigate how executive pay and its gap with employee pay influence the 
performance of Thailand tourism listed companies. 
Design/methodology/approach- We manually collect data on the executives’ and employees’ 
remunerations for Thailand tourism listed companies and use the data for our OLS regression 
analysis. To check the robustness of our results to potential endogeneity issues, we employ the 
two-stage least-squares regression analysis and the impact threshold for a confounding variable 
approach.  
Findings- We find that short-term executive compensation enhances firm performance, and that 
long-term executive compensation reduces the likelihood of unfavorable corporate performance. 
We also find that the gap in short-term pay between executives and employees has an inverted-U 
relation with firm performance. 
Originality/value- Our study sheds light on agency problems between executives and employees 
in tourism companies and provides new evidence and insights on compensation research in the 
tourism sector in emerging markets.  
Research limitations/implications- Our study suggests that higher executive pay relative to 
employee pay could encourage executives to work hard to improve corporate performance, but 
that too large a pay gap between executives and employees could impair employees’ morale and 
harm firm performance.  
Practical implications- It is important for tourism companies to not only pay executives well but 
also avoid too large a pay gap between executives and employees.  
Social implications- Our study implies the important role of compensation design in contributing 
to employee engagement and good performance for tourism firms.  
         
Keywords: Executive compensation; Pay gap; Thailand tourism; Corporate performance 
JEL Classifications: M12; L25; G34
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Introduction 
        This paper examines how executive compensation and its gap with the compensation of non-
executive employees (hereafters, employees) affect the performance of Thailand tourism 
companies. Tourism is a core economic pillar industry for the Kingdom of Thailand. The National 
Economic and Social Development Council of Thailand announced that the tourism industry 
contributes to 20% of the gross domestic product (GDP) in 2019 for Thailand, making it rank top 
3 in the Asia-Pacific area in terms of the contribution to GDP. Thailand has rich natural and cultural 
resources and strong price competitiveness in the tourism sector, attracting a great deal of foreign 
tourists every year. The World Tourism Organization reports that the international tourism income 
of Thailand grows to 60,521 million U.S. dollars in 2019 and is ranked as the highest tourism 
earner in the Asia-Pacific area for the year (see Figure 1). Thailand is not a high-income economy 
but stands out in the tourism sector around the globe, suggesting that the tourism sector in Thailand 
should be paid great attention for academic research. 
        Compensation is an essential issue for corporate governance as it influences the performance 
and growth of a firm. On the one hand, human resource theory emphasizes the importance of 
talented executives to a firm (Collings and Mellahi, 2009) and suggests that talented executives 
should be paid high as an incentive for them to contribute to good performance of their firm 
(Anginer et al., 2019). On this basis, high executive compensation is expected to be beneficial to 
firm performance (Carpenter et al., 2001). On the other hand, agency theory and stakeholder theory 
suggest that high compensation for executives compared with that for employees might negatively 
affect the employees’ morale, dedication, and creativity and thereby lower the productivity and 
performance of a firm. As such, a high pay for executives could be detrimental to firm performance 
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(Core et al., 1999). We shed light on these mixed views when examining how executive 
compensation influences the performance of Thailand tourism companies. 
Our research differs substantially from the related literature in the following ways. First, the 
existing literature investigates the aggregate compensation of executives and finds mixed results 
for its economic effects on firms. Our study probes different components of executive 
compensation. We study short-term vis-a-vis long-term compensation to see whether they have 
differential influences on firm performance. The short-term compensation in Thailand tourism 
firms encompasses salaries and bonuses, while the long-term compensation comprises pension and 
other deferred compensation which includes social security, provident funds, and retirement 
benefits.  
Second, our study focuses on tourism industry. It has its distinct characteristic regarding 
personnel relations of firms. Specifically, relative to executives, employees play a pivotal role in 
the daily operations and customer services of tourism firms. Overpay for executives could impair 
the employees’ incentives to work hard for customers and might even induce employees to 
expropriate customer resources for their own private benefits. As such, the agency problem 
between executives and employees is particularly pronounced in the tourism sector. While the 
previous literature emphasizes the agency conflict between executives and shareholders, our 
research makes an incremental contribution to the literature by shedding light on the potential 
agency conflict between executives and employees, particularly for the tourism industry.  
Third, we also study how the performance of tourism firms would be influenced by the pay 
gap between executives and employees. A reasonable design of compensation scheme for 
executives and employees would incentivize them to work hard and coordinatingly to maximize 
 4 
firm value (Firth et al., 2006). Therefore, it is of practical significance to investigate whether and 
how executive pay and its gap with employee pay would affect the performance of tourism firms. 
        We manually collect the data on the short-term and long-term pay for executives and 
employees for the period 2002-2018 from the annual reports of Thailand tourism listed companies. 
Using the data and OLS regression analysis, we find that the short-term executive compensation 
improves firm performance, and that the long-term executive compensation reduces the likelihood 
of unfavorable corporate performance. We also find that the gap in short-term pay between 
executives and employees has an inverted U-shaped association with firm performance. This 
suggests that higher executive pay relative to employee pay could encourage executives to work 
hard to improve firm performance, but that too large a pay gap between executives and employees 
could undermine employees’ morale, increase conflicts between executives and employees, and 
thereby harm corporate performance. We find no significant result for the gap in the long-term 
pension pay, suggesting that the gap in the deferred compensation has no immediate influence on 
incentive (mis)alignment between executives and employees and thus no impact on firm 
performance. We also utilize the two-stage least-squares regression analysis (2SLS) and the impact 
threshold for a confounding variable (ITCV) approach to check the robustness of our results to 
potential endogeneity issues, and our inferences continue to hold under the application of both 
approaches. 
        Our paper makes several contributions to the literature: First, to the best of our knowledge, 
this study is the first to use Thailand, a country world-renowned for travel and tourism, to examine 
the impact of compensation on the performance of tourism companies. Since tourism is such an 
economically important and world-class industry for Thailand, it provides a nice setting for us to 
shed light on the compensation issues for tourism firms in emerging markets. Second, prior 
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research focuses on the traditional agency conflict between executives and shareholders (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). We extend this literature by illuminating another agency conflict --- the 
conflict between executives and employees in tourism companies. Third, we contribute to the 
executive compensation literature by looking at different components of compensation and at the 
executive-employee pay gap for tourism firms. The executive- and employee-compensation data 
are unique in our study. We find all the annual reports from each company’s website and manually 
collect all the remuneration information, and thereby enrich the prior compensation research with 
the new dataset.  
 
Background, theory, and hypotheses 
Background  
For the tourism industry, Thailand is famous for its cultural and natural sites, five of which 
are included in the world heritage list by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO). The religious architectures, archeological museums, royal palaces, and 
monumental ruins in Thailand are among the most significant cultural patrimonies in Southeast 
Asia, attracting tons of foreign tourists from both the Eastern and Western countries. The number 
of foreign tourists in Thailand reaches 35.35 million, 38.28 million, and 39.80 million in the years 
2017, 2018, and 2019, respectively, contributing to 64.9%, 63.7%, and 64.1% of the total tourism 
revenue for Thailand. According to the Global Destination Cities Index, Bangkok has 22.78 
million foreign tourism visitors, surpassing Paris and London and ranking 1st among cities 
worldwide, in 2019.  
Tourism is also a major engine of Thailand’s economic growth and accounts for a substantive 
portion of Thailand GDP. Figure 2 shows that the contribution of tourism to GDP is continuously 
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going up for Thailand in the past 10 years. The Thailand government predicts that the tourism 
sector will account for 30% of GDP by year 2030, up from 20% in the year 2019. Given that 
Thailand is not highly developed in the economy but still globally remarkable in the tourism sector, 
it is important to investigate governance and compensation issues for Thailand tourism companies.  
 
Theories 
Human resource theory  
        Human resource (HR) theory emphasizes the importance of talented executives for a firm, 
contending that talented executives are valuable, inimitable, and irreplaceable (Wright et al., 1994). 
Talented executives could contribute to a sustainable competitive advantage through developing 
self-competence, generating tacit organizational knowledge, and building strong social 
relationship (Lado and Wilson, 1994). Brilliant executives have the capability of maximizing firm 
value and should thus be entitled to a large remuneration accordingly (Rosen, 1981). Prior 
literature (Carpenter et al., 2001) stresses the importance of human capital and reasonable 
remunerations for maintaining and developing a firm’s competitive advantage, and argues that a 
capable, talented manager or employee performing better for her/his job should deserve receiving 
a higher pay.   
 
Agency theory  
        Traditional agency theory pinpoints the concern that executives might not have the incentive 
to serve the interests of shareholders. In this study, we extend the literature by illuminating another 
agency conflict --- the conflict between executives and employees. In specific, for firms in the 
tourism industry, the agency conflict is manifested primarily in the incentive misalignment 
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between executives and employees. Since tourism is a service- and labor-intensive industry, 
managers are often not involved in daily affairs for their company, and employees are delegated 
to perform the tasks instead. If employees feel unfair with their compensation, they might 
expropriate corporate resources for their own private benefits rather than maximizing the value of 
their firm. For example, instead of focusing on serving tourists for sightseeing, a tourism guide 
may spend more time guiding tourists to shop in luxurious stores so as to reap more rebates for 
himself/herself from the tourist purchases. Employees might even steal client resources for self-
serving incentives such as pursuing personal merchandising business and setting up their own 
companies in private. This agency problem is commonly seen, particularly in tourism companies, 
and could substantially deteriorate firm performance.  
 
Stakeholder theory 
  Stakeholder theory pinpoints that stakeholder engagement that involves employees would 
help a firm enhance its performance (Freeman, 1984). Employees are increasingly regarded as the 
most important stakeholder of a tourism firm and the key for commercial success (Pfeffer, 1995). 
The attitudes, emotions, and behaviors of employees, especially those on the frontline, would 
largely determine the extent to which tourism services make customers satisfied. For instance, 
employees in Disney are expected to show a cheerful mood and an enjoyable appearance in their 
works, just as visitors are enjoying their time in the theme park (Bryman, 1999). Prior studies (e.g., 
Agyeiwaah et al., 2021) document that compensation is an important channel through which to 
motivate employees to establish and enhance customers’ attitudinal loyalty. The employees, if 
getting fair financial remunerations, will exhibit diligence, loyalty, enthusiasm, and generosity 
(Harrison and Wicks, 2013), which are conducive to firm performance. By contrast, overpay for 
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executives would generate a sense of inequity to employees and impair their incentives to serve 
their customers well, resulting in less satisfaction and loyalty of customers and thus worsening 
firm performance (Harrison and Wicks, 2013). Therefore, on top of agency theory, stakeholder 
theory also plays an important role in explaining how the pay for executives versus employees 
influences the performance of tourism companies.  
 
Hypotheses 
Short-term executive compensation 
        Compensation is rewarded to executives or employees based on their contributions to creating 
value for their firm. Short-term compensation for Thailand tourism firms consists of salaries and 
bonuses, which give executives an incentive to work hard for their firm. Human resource theory 
suggests that high short-term compensation is an effective mechanism to attract, retain, and 
incentivize talented executives and thereby boosts firm performance (Lado and Wilson, 1994; 
Carpenter et al., 2001). Thus, capable executives should be entitled to a large remuneration for 
purpose of enhancing firm performance (Rosen, 1981). Consistent with this view, prior studies 
(e.g., Gibbons and Murphy, 1990; Matolcsy, 2000; Jensen and Murphy, 1990) provide evidence 
of a positive relation between short-term executive compensation and firm performance. Based on 
the above discussion and the related literature, we put forward the following hypothesis: 
        H1: Short-term executive compensation is positively associated with the performance of 
Thailand tourism companies. 
 
Long-term executive compensation 
 9 
        Long-term executive compensation for Thailand tourism companies is composed of pension, 
social security funds, provident funds, and retirement benefits. These resemble “inside” debt, 
representing a firm’s obligation to make future payments for executives (He, 2015). Executives 
might lose part, or even all, of the pension and deferred compensation if the firm goes bankrupt. 
Therefore, executives who hold large amounts of these long-term compensations are averse to 
default risk and have incentives to prevent poor performance and bankruptcy of their firm (He, 
2015). To this end, they tend to adopt conservative investment and financial strategies to avoid 
firm risks (Cassell et al., 2012). In line with this proposition, the related literature provides 
evidence that the pension and deferred compensation lower financial risk (Sundaram and Yermack, 
2007), reduce the probability of accounting fraud or tax sheltering (He, 2015), and help firms to 
withstand adverse exogenous shocks (Bennett et al., 2015). On this basis, we expect that the 
pension and deferred compensation granted to executives in the Thailand tourism firms would help 
reduce the likelihood of corporate misconduct, default, and unfavorable performance. Accordingly, 
we propose the second hypothesis as follows: 
        H2: Long-term executive compensation in the form of pension and deferred compensation 
reduces the likelihood of unfavorable performance for Thailand tourism firms. 
 
Short-term pay gap 
        We further probe the effect of executive-employee pay gap on firm performance. The short-
term pay gap is defined as per capita short-term annual compensation for executives vis-a-vis 
employees. Executives are in charge of formulating and implementing corporate strategies and 
internal controls. Talented and capable executives could do a good job in expanding business and 
creating value for their firms, and in return, receive a large remuneration (Rosen, 1981). Previous 
 10 
literature (Lazear, 1979; Rosen, 1982) shows that, when the senior leadership by talented 
executives is scant in a firm, an increased pay gap between employees and talented executives 
could generate better firm performance.  
On the other hand, although talented executives are worth every penny, a growing 
discrepancy between executive compensation and employee compensation might induce a sense 
of unfairness to employees and discourage them from working efficiently and cooperatively with 
executives to improve firm performance (Cowherd and Levine, 1992). Charness and Kuhn (2007) 
find evidence that employees tend to shirk their works and responsibilities in cases when paid less 
than their co-workers. For tourism companies, executives often entrust employees with the tasks 
of serving tourists. Good and fair employee treatments are conducive to ameliorating the attitudes, 
emotions, and serving behavior of employees to their customers. Fair employee compensation is 
also regarded as an integral part of organizational culture that helps enhance firm performance 
(Tajeddini and Trueman, 2012; Oh and Han, 2020; Reino et al., 2020; Seidu et al., 2021). Too 
high an executive pay relative to the employee pay could impair employees’ morale, increase 
agency conflicts between executives and employees, and thereby harm corporate performance. Or 
rather, employees are discouraged from serving customers well, and might even divert client 
resources from the company to serve their own interests, making their firm lose its competitive 
advantage and value. Based on the above discussion, we hypothesize the following: 
        H3: The gap in short-term pay between executives and employees has an inverted U-shaped 
relationship with the performance of Thailand tourism companies. 
 
Long-term pay gap 
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        The long-term pay gap is defined as per capita long-term compensation for executives vis-a-
vis employees. Both executives and employees will not get the long-term pay (which consists of 
pension and deferred compensation) until a plausibly distant future point when they retire or when 
their firm goes bankrupt. Furthermore, the pension and deferred compensation are subject to 
adjustments during the period leading up to the retirement of executives and employees. Therefore, 
unlike the foregoing short-term pay gap, the long-term pay gap is likely to have no immediate 
influence on incentive (mis)alignment between executives and employees and thus no impact on 
the performance of tourism firms. Accordingly, we put forth our fourth hypothesis as follows:  
H4: The gap in long-term pay between executives and employees has no relationship with the 
performance of Thailand tourism companies. 
 
Data and research design 
Data 
Referring to the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) of Thailand, we seek the data on 
Thailand listed firms in the Travel and Leisure industries, covering hotels, restaurants, airlines, 
gambling, recreational services, travel, and tourism. We manually collect annual reports from each 
company’s website and get every data for the executives’ and employees’ remunerations during 
the period 2002-2018. There are 224 firm-year observations that have disclosed compensation 
information. Since our sample size is relatively small, any outliers existing in our sample are likely 
to bias our multivariate results. We drop 6 observations for “Nok airlines” which have extremely 
low return on equity. We exclude 4 observations with extremely high per capita long-term 
executive compensation; these observations are “Asia aviation” for the year 2012 and “Dusit thani” 
for the years 2008, 2016, and 2017. We delete 2 observations with missing values in the book-to-
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market ratio for “Raja ferry port”. After removal of these outliers, we obtain 212 firm-year 
observations for 29 firms in the tourism sector. Further, we manually collect corporate governance 
data, including the number of directors and the percentage of independent directors on the board 
of a tourism firm. For other financial information, we get the data from the Bloomberg database 
and the website of the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET). Following common practice (e.g., He 
et al., 2019), we winsorize all the continuous variables at the 1% and 99% levels, respectively, for 
our multivariate tests.  
 
Models  
        To test the hypothesis H1 regarding whether short-term executive compensation is positively 
associated with firm performance, we employ an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model: 
The dependent variable is ROA, ROE, or Tobin_Q, which is our proxy for firm performance.  Since 
remunerations are paid on a monthly basis for executives and employees, the compensation paid 
to executives in a year should affect firm performance for the same year. Hence, we measure 
executive compensation and firm performance to be in the same year for our regression analysis, 
as does the related literature (Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985; Jensen and Murphy, 1990). The key 
independent variable is MST, defined as per capita short-term annual compensation, consisting of 
salaries and bonuses, for executives. If the coefficient of MST is positive and statistically 
significant at a conventional level, the hypothesis H1 is supported.  
         To test the hypothesis H2 --- that long-term executive compensation reduces the likelihood 
of unfavorable corporate performance, we apply a probit regression model: The dependent variable 
is DummyROA (DummyROE or DummyTobin_Q), which equals 1 if return on assets (return on 
equity or Tobin’s Q) for a tourism firm in a year is below its sample median, and 0 otherwise. We 
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use this binary variable to capture the likelihood of unfavorable firm performance. The key 
independent variable is MLT, defined as per capita long-term executive compensation, comprising 
pension, provident funds, social security, and retirement funds, for executives. If the hypothesis 
H2 holds, the coefficient of 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 should be negative and statistically significant at a conventional 
level.  
        To test the hypothesis H3 --- that the gap in short-term pay for executives vis-a-vis employees 
has an inverted-U relationship with corporate performance, we use an OLS regression model: The 
dependent variable is ROA, ROE, or Tobin_Q. The key independent variables are 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃_𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀 and 
PayGap_ST_SQ. PayGap_ST is the short-term executive-employee pay gap, calculated as per 
capita short-term annual compensation for executives, divided by that for employees; 
PayGap_ST_SQ is the square of the short-term pay gap (PayGap_ST). If the short-term pay gap 
has an inverted-U relation with firm performance, the coefficient of PayGap_ST (PayGap_ST_SQ) 
should take on a positive (negative) sign and statistically significant at a conventional level.  
        To test the hypothesis H4 --- that the gap in long-term pay for executives vis-a-vis employees 
has no relation with firm performance, we utilize a probit regression model: The dependent 
variable is DummyROA, DummyROE, or DummyTobin_Q, which are as defined previously. The 
key independent variables are PayGap_LT and PayGap_LT_SQ. PayGap_LT is the long-term 
executive-employee pay gap, calculated as per capita long-term compensation for executives, 
divided by that for employees; PayGap_LT_SQ is the square of the long-term pay gap 
(PayGap_LT). The hypothesis H4 predicts that neither PayGap_LT nor PayGap_LT_SQ is 
statistically significant at a conventional level.  
For all the foregoing four regressions, we follow related literature (Al-Najjar, 2015; Aboody 
et al., 2010) to control for a series of financial and governance characteristics that are likely to be 
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related to firm performance. These characteristics include firm size (Size), financial leverage 
(Leverage), the book-to-market ratio (BM), the number of board directors (BoardSize), and the 
percentage of independent board directors (IndepBoard). All these control variables are defined in 
Appendix 1. We also include year dummies in all the regressions, and cluster the standard errors 





        Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of the variables used for the regression analysis. The 
mean value of MST is 5.621, suggesting that the per capita short-term executive compensation, 
including salaries and bonuses, is on average 5.621 million baht for the Thailand tourism firms. 
The mean of MLT is 0.262. This statistic suggests that the per capita executive long-term 
compensation, including pension, social security funds, provident funds, and retirement funds, 
amounts to 0.262 million, equivalent to around 4.67% of the average of the per capita short-term 
executive compensation. The mean values of the short-term pay gap (PayGap_ST) and the long-
term pay gap (PayGap_LT) are 20.79 and 24.22, respectively.  
 
Multivariate results 
        Table 2 reports the results for the tests of the hypothesis H1. Columns (1), (2), and (3) present 
the results of the regressions where the dependent variables are ROA, ROE, and Tobin_Q, 
respectively. In Column (1), the coefficient on MST is 0.206 with the statistical significance level 
of 5%. This indicates that the short-term executive compensation is positively associated with 
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return on assets. In Column (2), MST is positively associated with ROE with the statistical 
significance level of 1%. In Column (3), MST and Tobin_Q are positively correlated, with a t value 
of 1.72. A one-standard-deviation increases in MST leads to an increase of 21.95%, 26.59%, and 
16.65% of the sample mean values of ROA, ROE, and Tobin_Q, respectively. Thus, the results are 
not only statistically significant but also economically significant in supporting our hypothesis H1, 
and suggest that the short-term compensation in the form of salaries and bonuses motivates 
executives to work hard for improving firm performance.  
        Table 3 presents the results for the tests of the hypothesis H2. Columns (1), (2), and (3) present 
the results of the regressions where the dependent variables are DummyROA, DummyROE, and 
DummyTobin_Q, respectively. From Column (1), we see that MLT is negatively related to 
DummyROA with the statistical significance at the 1% level. This result suggests that long-term 
executive compensation in the form of pension and deferred compensation decreases the 
probability of unfavorable firm performance. In Columns (2) and (3), the coefficients on MLT are 
also negative and statistically significant. The marginal effects of MLT for the probit regressions 
of DummyROA, DummyROE, and DummyTobin_Q are -0.231, -0.196, and -0.201, respectively. 
This suggests that a one-standard-deviation increase in MLT decreases 14.61%, 12.4%, and 12.46% 
of the sample mean values of DummyROA, DummyROE, and DummyTobin_Q, respectively. 
Hence, the results are both statistically and economically significant in supporting the hypothesis 
H2. For robustness check, we re-define the dependent variable as equal to 1 if return on assets 
(return on equity or Tobin’s Q) is ranked within the bottom three deciles in our sample, and equal 
to 0 otherwise. We find that MLT is negatively correlated with the re-defined dependent variables, 
with a t value equal to -1.59 (-1.20 or -2.04). This finding (available upon request) adds to the 
robustness of our baseline results for the hypothesis H2. 
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         Table 4 shows the results for the tests of the hypothesis H3. In Column (1), PayGap_ST is 
significantly, positively correlated with ROA, while PayGap_ST_SQ is significantly, negatively 
related to ROA. This indicates an inverted U-shaped relationship of PayGap_ST with ROA. Similar 
results are found in Columns (2) and (3): The coefficients on PayGap_ST (PayGap_ST_SQ) are 
positive (negative) and statistically significant in explaining ROE and Tobin_Q. All these results 
support the hypothesis H3 --- that the gap in short-term pay for executives vis-a-vis employees has 
an inverted U-shaped relationship with the performance of Thailand tourism listed companies.         
Our hypothesis H4 predicts that the gap in long-term pay for executives vis-a-vis employees has 
no relationship with firm performance. In Table 5, neither PayGap_LT nor PayGap_LT_SQ has a 
statistically significant coefficient, which is thus consistent with the hypothesis H4. Lastly, the 
values of variance inflation factors (VIFs) of the regressors used for the tests of the hypotheses 
H1-H4 are all below 10, suggesting no multicollinearity issue with our regression analyses. 
 
Robustness tests 
Two-stage Least Squares regression analysis 
        Executive compensation and firm performance could be endogenously correlated (Palia, 
2001). To enhance our inference on their causal relationship, we use two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
regression to re-test our hypotheses. Majority of the tourism literature employs lagged independent 
variables as the instrumental variable for 2SLS regression to address potential reverse-causality 
problems (e.g., Yeh, 2018; Al-Najjar, 2014). Thus, following the literature, we take one-year lag 
of our compensation variables and control variables, and use them (i.e., the variables measured at 
year t-1) as instrumental variables in our 2SLS regression. We also include in the first-stage 
regression the control variables measured at year t, such that the control variables at year t-1 would 
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not have further direct impact on firm performance at year t (i.e., the dependent variable in the 
second-stage regression), except indirectly through the compensation variables at year t (i.e., the 
dependent variable in the first-stage regression). Furthermore, remunerations are paid every month 
for executives and employees in a year and thus have an immediate, direct impact on firm 
performance for the same year, whereas the compensation for the previous year should not directly 
influence the current year’s firm performance. Therefore, the variables as to the compensation and 
control variables in year t-1 should be the valid instruments for use in our 2SLS regression analysis.  
         Panel A in Table 6 presents the 2SLS regression results for the hypotheses H1 and H2. In 
Columns (1-3), MST is significantly, positively correlated with ROA, ROE, and Tobin_Q, thus 
supporting the hypothesis H1. From Columns (4) and (5), where the results for the regressions of 
DummyROA and DummyROE are tabulated, we find MLT has statistically negative coefficients, 
thus consistent with the hypothesis H2. But we find no statistically significant correlation of MLT 
with DummyTobin_Q in Column (6), probably because of the limited power of Tobin’s Q in 
capturing the degree of firm performance (Engel et al., 2003). Panel B shows the results for the 
hypotheses H3 and H4. In Columns (1-3), the coefficients on PayGap_ST are positive and 
statistically significant, while the coefficients on PayGap_ST_SQ are significantly negative. These 
results support the hypothesis H3. In Columns (4-6), the coefficients for PayGap_LT and 
PayGap_LT_SQ are not statistically significant. Thus, the hypothesis H4 is confirmed. All the 
partial F-statistics, shown beneath the 2SLS regression results in both panels of Table 7, are above 
the cutoff points specified by Stock et al. (2002), thereby negating the weak instrument issue with 
our 2SLS regression analysis. 
 
Analysis of the impact threshold for a confounding variable  
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        There might be some variables that we do not include in the regressions and that are correlated 
with both executive compensation and firm performance. Such omitted variables might bias our 
regression results. To address this concern, we apply the impact threshold for a confounding 
variable (ITCV) approach to check whether our results are subject to correlated-omitted-variable(s) 
bias (e.g., He and Marginson, 2020; He et al., 2021). Using this approach, we can gauge how 
strong the omitted-variable(s) bias would be to invalidate our results (Frank, 2000). The greater 
the ITCV value for the independent variable, the less likely our results are biased by a potential 
omitted variable.  
        Table 7 reports the results for ITCV analysis of all our baseline hypothesis tests. Columns 
(1)-(3) of Panel A presents the ITCV results for the hypothesis H1. The value of ITCV is 0.1474 
in Column (1), suggesting that the impact of an omitted variable must be at least 0.1474 to 
invalidate our inference drawn from the ROA regression. However, we find no control variable 
that has partial impact with its absolute value higher than 0.1474. This implies that our ROA 
regression result is immune from potential correlated-omitted-variable(s) bias. Similar ITCV 
results are found for the ROE regression and the Tobin_Q regression in Columns (2) and (3), 
respectively, thereby providing further support for the robustness of our regression results for the 
hypothesis H1. Columns (4)-(6) show the ITCV results for the hypothesis H2. We find that no 
control variable, except IndepBoard in Column (5), has partial impact greater than the absolute 
value of ITCV. This lends support to the robustness of our results for the hypothesis H2.  
        Columns (1)-(3) of Panel B show the ITCV results for the hypothesis H3. The ITCV values 
for PayGap_ST are 0.2526, 0.1824, and 0.2587 for the ROA, ROE, and Tobin_Q regressions, 
respectively. The partial impacts of all the control variables are lower than the ITCV threshold, 
suggesting that an omitted variable, even if existing, is unlikely to pose a threat to our regression 
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analysis of the hypothesis H3. Columns (4)-(6) report the ITCV results for the hypothesis H4. The 
ITCV value for PayGap_LT is significantly larger in magnitude than the partial impacts of all 
control variables, except BM in Columns (5) and (6). This offers assurance for the validity of our 
baseline regression results for the hypothesis H4. Overall, the ITCV results in Table 7 suggest that 
our results presented in Tables 2-5 are free from potential correlated-omitted-variable(s) bias.  
       Our results of the 2SLS regressions and ITCV tests mitigate potential endogeneity concerns 
with our baseline regression results and thereby lend support to the causal inferences for our 
hypotheses. Theoretically, our baseline regression analyses should not be confounded by 
endogeneity concern for two reasons. First, the short-term compensation for Thailand tourism 
firms contains salaries and bonuses. The salaries are generally fixed over the tenure term. The 
bonuses are often paid once a year before the annual report comes out, and thus are not necessarily 
tied to firm performance. Furthermore, the bonus-to-salary ratio for our sample averages around 
30%, which is relatively low compared with the bonus-to-salary ratios for U.S. firms and U.K. 
firms (Bruce et al., 2007; Cheng et al., 2015). Therefore, overall, the short-term compensation in 
Thailand tourism companies is less affected by firm performance, making endogeneity less of a 
concern to our study. Second, the labor unions in developed countries provide support for 
employees to bargain and negotiate for fair compensation based on firm performance. However, 
we do not find any information about labor unions for the Thailand tourism companies from their 
annual reports. Moreover, most of the reports show “no complaint on the unfair treatment”, “no 
serious labor dispute”, “no critical conflict of labor”, etc. From this, we posit that the employees 
in Thailand have less say on their compensation. As such, it is unlikely that firm performance, in 
turn, affects executive/employee compensation in the context of our study. In all, both our 
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robustness tests and conceptual arguments confute the possibility that our regression results 
reported in Tables 2-5 are driven by endogeneity.  
 
Conclusion 
        We examine how executive compensation influences the performance of Thailand tourism 
companies. Based on the sample of Thailand tourism listed companies and our hand-collected data 
on executives’ and employees’ remunerations, we find a positive impact of short-term executive 
compensation on firm performance, and that the pension and deferred compensation for executives 
reduce the likelihood of unfavorable corporate performance. These findings underscore the 
importance of executive compensation in contributing to the performance of tourism companies. 
We also find that the gap in short-term pay for executives vis-a-vis employees has an inverted U-
shaped association with firm performance. This finding is consistent with our contention that 
higher executive compensation relative to employee pay helps improve corporate performance, 
but that too large the pay gap increases the agency problems between executives and employees 
and thus harms firm performance.  
 
Theoretical implications 
        Fair compensation is a key dimension in measuring organizational culture, the most 
significant attribute of excellent businesses for tourism companies (e.g., Seidu et al., 2021). An 
appropriate salary for employees helps a firm to build a harmonious culture environment and to 
achieve a high level of success in marketplaces (Elkhwesky et al., 2019). Though high 
compensation could encourage executives to work hard for their firm, too high a pay for executives 
relative to employees could impair employees’ morale due to inequity aversion. In consequence, 
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employees would not maximize the interest of their firm. They might even expropriate the client 
resources of their company for their own purposes and thereby grab private benefits. We highlight 
this type of agency problem in our research, and thereby complement the prior literature on agency 
theory which focuses predominantly on the agency conflicts between shareholders and executives. 
We also link stakeholder theory to our study. In specific, to develop business well, a firm should 
take responsibility for, and care of, its stakeholders including employees. Overpay for executives 
are at odds with this tenet and would thus undermine firm performance. Overall, our study provides 
new insights on compensation research for the tourism sector in emerging markets.  
 
Practical implications 
       Our study implies to boards of directors and compensation committees of tourism firms the 
importance of avoiding too large a pay gap between executives and employees. When designing 
the compensation contracts, the boards of directors and compensation committees should account 
for both the executive compensation and its gap with that the employee compensation, not just the 
former. Or rather, while raising the pay for executives to incentivize them to serve their company 
better, it is crucial to lift the pay for employees as well.  
 
Limitation and future research 
        Our study is subject to a limitation. There are only 33 tourism listed companies in Thailand. 
We manually collect the compensation and governance data from the annual reports from each of 
the tourism companies’ websites. But quite a few companies do not make voluntary disclosure of 
their compensation and governance information. As a result, the sample size of our study is 
relatively small. Nevertheless, our paper should represent an important step forward in 
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understanding the compensation incentives of executives and employees and the economic 
consequences of such incentives. Future research might further investigate how the disparity of 
































Variables Definitions  
ROAt Net income (in hundreds), divided by the average total assets, in year t. 
ROEt Net income (in hundreds), divided by the average total common equity, in year t. 




1 if return on assets is below the sample median, and 0 otherwise, in year t. 
DummyROEt  
 
1 if return on equity is below the sample median, and 0 otherwise, in year t. 
DummyTobin_Qt 
 
1 if the Tobin’s Q is below the sample median, and 0 otherwise, in year t. 
MSTt Per capita short-term annual compensation (in millions) for executives, which 
comprises salaries and bonuses, in year t. 
MLTt Per capita long-term annual compensation (in millions) for executives, which 
consists of pension, provident fund, social security, and retirement fund, in year t.  
ESTt Per capita short-term annual compensation (in millions) for employees, which 
consists of salaries and bonuses, in year t. 
ELTt Per capita long-term annual compensation (in millions) for employees, which 
comprises pension, provident fund, social security, and retirement fund, in year t.  
PayGap_STt Per capita short-term annual compensation for executives, divided by per capita 
short-term annual compensation for employees, in year t. 
PayGap_LTt per capita long-term annual compensation for executives, divided by per capita 
long-term annual compensation for employees, in year t. 
PayGap_ST_SQt The square value of PayGap_ST in year t. 
PayGap_LT_SQt The square value of PayGap_LT in year t. 
LnSizet The natural logarithm of total assets in year t.  
Leveraget Total debt (in hundreds), divided total assets, in year t.  
BMt The book value of equity divided by the market value of equity in year t.  
BoardSizet  The total number of directors on the board of a firm in year t. 
IndepBoardt The total number of independent directors (in hundreds) on the board of a firm, 
divided by the total number of directors, in year t. 
Yeardummies Year dummies for the period 2002-2018. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable N Mean Std. Min. 25% 50% Max. 
ROAt 212 5.532 5.552 -6.740 1.853 4.589 21.82 
ROEt 212 10.51 12.16 -31.85 2.962 9.954 43.19 
Tobin_Qt 212 1.703 1.359 0.207 0.937 1.157 8.150 
DummyROAt  
 
212 0.491 0.501 0 0 0 1 
DummyROEt  
 
212 0.486 0.501 0 0 0 1 
DummyTobin_Qt  
 
212 0.495 0.501 0 0 0 1 
MSTt 205 5.621 5.895 0.821 2.309 3.697 30.61 
MLTt 160 0.262 0.310 0 0.0493 0.151 1.671 
ESTt 197 0.493 0.501 0.103 0.167 0.261 1.861 
ELTt 172 0.0455 0.0657 0.000427 0.00455 0.0150 0.239 
PayGap_STt 190 20.79 30.97 1.028 5.404 11.16 185.5 
PayGap_LTt 126 24.22 40.38 0.279 1.652 7.162 249.4 
LnSizet 212 9.470 1.432 6.590 8.500 9.355 12.62 
Leveraget 212 31.04 19.88 0 16.45 31.82 76.72 
BMt 212 1.326 3.832 0.0907 0.270 0.664 32.55 
BoardSizet  212 11.18 2.570 6 9 11 19 
IndepBoardt 212 0.397 0.103 0.105 0.333 0.400 0.733 
Notes: Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of all the variables used for the regression analysis. All the 
variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
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Table 2: Tests of the hypothesis H1 
The effect of short-term executive compensation on firm performance 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 ROAt ROEt Tobin_Qt 
MSTt 0.206** 0.474*** 0.0481* 
 [2.71] [3.46] [1.72] 
LnSizet -1.243*** -1.964** -0.386** 
 [-2.91] [-2.42] [-2.13] 
Leveraget -0.108*** -0.106 -0.00784 
 [-3.21] [-1.49] [-1.01] 
BMt -0.578*** -0.854*** -0.102*** 
 [-4.44] [-3.05] [-2.80] 
BoardSizet 0.169 0.509 0.0596 
 [0.93] [1.04] [0.82] 
IndepBoardt 6.072 9.125 1.270 
 [1.04] [0.94] [0.88] 
Yeardummies included included included 
_cons 16.68*** 27.60*** 4.423** 
 [3.59] [2.93] [2.76] 
Adj.R2 0.303 0.128 0.162 
N 205 205 205 
Notes: Table 2 reports the OLS regression results for the tests of the effect of short-term executive compensation 
on firm performance. Both the dependent variable and independent variables are measured in the same year (t). 
All the variables are defined in Appendix 1. After dropping the missing values in MST, 205 observations remain 





Table 3: Tests of the hypothesis H2 
The effect of long-term executive compensation on firm performance 







MLTt -1.095*** -0.967** -1.436*** 
 [-2.98] [-2.19] [-2.69] 
LnSizet 0.00870 -0.110 0.474** 
 [0.05] [-0.59] [2.34] 
Leveraget 0.0281** 0.0116 -0.0160 
 [2.32] [1.05] [-1.15] 
BMt 1.676*** 2.254*** 3.498*** 
 [5.05] [4.95] [3.81] 
BoardSizet 0.00793 0.00523 0.0157 
 [0.09] [0.05] [0.14] 
IndepBoardt -2.476* -5.365*** -2.929 
 [-1.83] [-3.05] [-1.33] 
Yeardummies included included included 
_cons -0.795 1.750* -4.191*** 
 [-0.68] [1.68] [-2.88] 
Marginal effect -0.231*** -0.196*** -0.201*** 
 [-3.24] [-2.39] [-3.37] 
Pseudo R2 0.445 0.480 0.652 
N 156 158 153 
Notes: Table 3 reports the probit regression results for the tests of the effect of long-term executive compensation 
on firm performance. Both the dependent variable and independent variables are measured in the same year (t). 
All the variables are defined in Appendix 1. After dropping the missing values in MLT, 156, 158, and 153 
observations remain for running the regressions of DummyROA, DummyROE, and DummyTobin_Q, respectively. 
***, **, * denote the two-tailed statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4: Tests of the hypothesis H3 
The effect of short-term executive-employee pay gap on firm performance 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 ROAt ROEt Tobin_Qt 
PayGap_STt 0.169** 0.293*** 0.0411** 
 [2.56] [2.86] [2.38] 
PayGap_ST_SQt -0.000772* -0.00118* -0.000193* 
 [-1.93] [-1.84] [-1.86] 
LnSizet -1.137* -1.413* -0.270* 
 [-2.02] [-1.80] [-1.71] 
Leveraget -0.118*** -0.134* -0.0104 
 [-3.87] [-1.81] [-1.67] 
BMt -0.513*** -0.713*** -0.0790** 
 [-4.89] [-3.23] [-2.49] 
BoardSizet 0.345 0.750 0.0715 
 [1.54] [1.51] [1.24] 
IndepBoardt 6.986 9.895 1.334 
 [1.53] [1.12] [1.33] 
Yeardummies included included included 
_cons 10.88** 12.95* 2.603* 
 [2.34] [1.98] [1.72] 
Adj.R2 0.390 0.195 0.256 
N 190 190 190 
Notes: Table 4 reports the OLS regression results for the tests of the effect of the short-term executive-employee 
pay gap on firm performance. Both the dependent variable and independent variables are measured in the same 
year (t). All the variables are defined in Appendix 1. After dropping the missing values in PayGap_ST, 190 
observations remain for the hypothesis tests. ***, **, * denote the two-tailed statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5: Tests of the hypothesis H4 
The effect of long-term executive-employee pay gap on firm performance  
 (1) (2) (3) 






PayGap_LTt 0.0198 0.00348 0.000145 
 [1.45] [0.30] [0.01] 
PayGap_LT_SQt -0.000142** -0.0000413 0.00000425 
 [-1.97] [-0.68] [0.09] 
LnSizet -0.0215 -0.178 0.250 
 [-0.10] [-0.85] [1.12] 
Leveraget 0.0270** 0.0140 -0.0122 
 [2.12] [1.35] [-1.05] 
BMt 1.874*** 2.424*** 2.837*** 
 [3.24] [3.17] [3.09] 
BoardSizet -0.00648 0.0187 0.0299 
 [-0.06] [0.15] [0.26] 
IndepBoardt -3.410** -6.008*** -2.600 
 [-2.35] [-3.05] [-1.25] 
Yeardummies included included included 
_cons -0.771 1.865* -2.486 
 [-0.65] [1.92] [-1.40] 
Pseudo R2 0.449 0.462 0.571 
N 112 118 115 
Notes: Table 5 reports the probit regression results for the tests of the effect of the long-term executive-employee 
pay gap on firm performance. Both the dependent variable and independent variables are measured in the same 
year (t). All the variables are defined in Appendix 1. After dropping the missing values in PayGap_LT, 112, 118, 
and 115 observations remain for running the regressions of DummyROA, DummyROE, and DummyTobin_Q, 
respectively. ***, **, * denote the two-tailed statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6: Robustness tests of the hypotheses H1, H2, H3, and H4 using 2SLS regression analysis 
   Panel A 
2SLS test of the hypothesis H1  2SLS test of the hypothesis H2 
First-stage regression  Second-stage regression  First-stage regression  Second-stage regression  
    (1) (2) (3)      (4) (5) (6) 


















MSTt-1 0.953***  MSTt 0.212*** 0.493*** 0.0427***  MLTt-1 0.732***  MSTt -0.376** -0.298* -0.171 
 [22.74]   [3.69] [3.33] [3.22]   [7.38]   [-2.20] [-1.67] [-1.00] 
LnSizet-1 -1.250***  LnSizet -1.193*** -1.797* -0.304***  LnSizet-1 -0.237***  LnSizet 0.0385 -0.00891 0.100** 
 [-2.34]   [-3.69] [-1.80] [-4.03]   [-3.80]   [0.94] [-0.19] [2.23] 
Leveraget-1 0.0209  Leveraget -0.125*** -0.167*** -0.00892**  Leveraget-1 -0.008**  Leveraget 0.00198 -0.00293 -0.00664*** 
 [0.99]   [-7.16] [-3.64] [-2.35]   [-2.14]   [0.96] [-1.17] [-2.69] 
BMt-1 0.106  BMt -0.631*** -0.951*** -0.106***  BMt-1 -0.053  BMt 0.0291*** 0.0266*** 0.0277*** 
 [0.34]   [-6.18] [-4.09] [-3.79]   [-1.15]   [3.35] [2.78] [3.11] 
BoardSizet-1 -0.225  BoardSizet 0.269* 0.726* 0.0451  BoardSizet-1 0.042*  BoardSizet -0.00072 0.0105 0.00472 
 [-1.28]   [1.88] [1.67] [1.27]   [1.67]   [-0.03] [0.37] [0.17] 
IndepBoardt-1 -0.718  IndepBoardt 7.396** 11.83 1.334*  IndepBoardt-1 -0.653  IndepBoardt -0.419 -0.740 -0.371 
 [-0.27]   [2.03] [1.08] [1.88]   [-1.63]   [-0.96] [-1.48] [-0.83] 
Controlst included       Controlst included      
Yeardummies included  Yeardummies included included included  Yeardummies included  Yeardummies included included included 
_cons 0.248  _cons 18.40*** 42.00** 3.730***  _cons -0.077  _cons 0.808** 0.841* 0.375 
 [0.23]   [5.26] [2.51] [5.18]   [-0.55]   [2.27] [1.73] [1.17] 
N 175  N 175 175 175  N 134  N 134 134 134 
         Partial F-statistics 185.41 185.41 185.41           Partial F-statistics 31.07 31.07 31.07 
 Under-identification Wald statistics  34.92*** 34.92*** 34.92***   Under-identification Wald statistics  23.72*** 23.72*** 23.72*** 
                                             P-value (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)                                                P-value (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
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Table 6: Continued 
Panel B 
2SLS test of the hypothesis H3  2SLS test of the hypothesis H4 
First-stage regression  Second-stage regression  First-stage regression  Second-stage regression 
    (1) (2) (3)      (4) (5) (6) 


















PayGap_STt-1 0.497***  PayGap_STt 0.198*** 0.391*** 0.0465***  PayGap_LTt-1 0.200**  PayGap_LTt 0.00106 -0.00009 -0.00346 
 [7.93]   [4.75] [4.41] [5.51]   [2.52]   [0.27] [-0.02] [-0.64] 
    PayGap_ST_SQt -0.00093*** -0.0017*** -0.00023***       PayGap_LT_SQt -0.00001 -0.000005 0.000011 
     [-3.54] [-3.16] [-4.05]       [-0.64] [-0.26] [0.47] 
LnSizet-1 -2.371  LnSizet -0.988*** -1.219 -0.252***  LnSizet-1 -15.997***  LnSizet -0.0548 -0.110** 0.00725 
 [-1.43]   [-3.09] [-1.37] [-3.31]   [-3.36]   [-1.32] [-2.41] [0.16] 
Leveraget-1 0.058  Leveraget -0.141*** -0.203*** -0.0122***  Leveraget-1 0.233  Leveraget 0.00823*** 0.00535* -0.000609 
 [0.67]   [-8.29] [-4.18] [-3.72]   [0.97]   [3.16] [1.75] [-0.17] 
BMt-1 0.052  BMt -0.528*** -0.707*** -0.0806***  BMt-1 -1.640  BMt 0.335*** 0.378*** 0.362*** 
 [0.05]   [-7.19] [-4.06] [-3.64]   [-0.71]   [5.14] [5.28] [4.99] 
BoardSizet-1 0.237  BoardSizet 0.435*** 0.946* 0.0815**  BoardSizet-1 -1.025  BoardSizet 0.0229 0.0328 0.0196 
 [0.42]   [2.76] [1.89] [2.44]   [-0.74]   [1.01] [1.30] [0.73] 
IndepBoardt-1 -5.795  IndepBoardt 8.118** 10.18 1.466***  IndepBoardt-1 8.362  IndepBoardt -0.380 -0.659 -0.268 
 [-0.76]   [2.41] [0.84] [2.61]   [0.44]   [-0.90] [-1.51] [-0.69] 
Controlst included       Controlst included      
Yeardummies included  Yeardummies included included included  Yeardummies included  Yeardummies included included included 
_cons 10.016**  _cons 12.37*** 30.99 2.337**  _cons 21.986**  _cons 0.650** 0.181 0.463* 
 [2.06]   [2.65] [1.60] [2.57]   [2.43]   [2.15] [0.57] [1.68] 
N 163  N 163 163 163  N 104  N 104 104 104 
                    Partial F-statistics 29.72 29.72 29.72                         Partial F-statistics 5.01 5.01 5.01 
              Under-identification Wald statistics   28.43*** 28.43*** 28.43***                   Under-identification Wald statistics 24.93*** 24.93*** 24.93*** 
                                                           P-value (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)                                                                P-value (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Notes: Table 6 shows the first-stage and second-stage regression results of 2SLS for the tests of the hypotheses H1, H2, H3, and H4. All the variables are defined 
in Appendix 1. Controlst in the first-stage regressions indicates the control variables that are measured at year t and are the same as those controlled in the second-
stage regressions. Other independent variables in the first-stage regressions are measured at year t-1, one year lagged behind the measurement window for the 
dependent variable. Both the independent variables and dependent variables in the second-stage regressions are measured in the same year (t). ***, **, * denote 
the two-tailed statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7: Robustness tests for the hypotheses H1, H2, H3, and H4 using ITCV analysis 
Panel A        
 ITCV test of the hypothesis H1  ITCV test of the hypothesis H2 





















LnSizet -0.0898 -0.0374 -0.1246  0.013 0.0007 0.0351 
Leveraget 0.0037 0.0016 0.0011  -0.0136 0.0096 0.031 
BMt 0.0313 0.0206 0.0223  -0.0238 -0.02 -0.0228 
BoardSizet 0.004 -0.0039 -0.0083  -0.0005 -0.0003 0.0004 
IndepBoardt -0.0152 -0.0045 -0.0107  0.0106 0.0232 0.0078 
Impact threshold for 
confounding variable 
(ITCV) 0.1474 0.1021 0.1359 
 
-0.0385 0.0222 0.0642 
Panel B        























LnSizet 0.0076 0.0041 0.0076  0.0052 0.017 -0.0061 
Leveraget -0.0107 -0.0053 -0.0041  0.1092 0.0593 -0.0289 
BMt 0.0924 0.0592 0.0684  -0.15 -0.1567 -0.1743 
BoardSizet -0.0005 -0.007 -0.0062  -0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0021 
IndepBoardt 0.0018 0.001 0.0014  0.0167 0.0256 0.0049 
Impact threshold for 
confounding variable 
(ITCV) 0.2526 0.1824 0.2587 
 
-0.0522 -0.1523 0.1607 
Notes: Table 7 reports the impact threshold for confounding variables (namely, ITCV) for the multivariate tests of the hypotheses H1, H2, H3, and H4. The 
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